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Senior Honors Project:
Is a Perfect God Worthy of Our Praise?
Research/SHP Advisor: Andrew Eshleman
Abstract: This project examines the Judeo-Christian notion of God’s essential perfection as a
problem for God’s praiseworthiness. Granted that God cannot commit any action less perfect
than what God performs, God seems to lack the freedom to be responsible and is thus rendered
ineligible for praise. In exploring another kind of responsibility, I argue that an essentially
perfect God can be considered responsible in another sense, which may warrant at least one form
of praise-practice: a praise that simply acknowledges expression of the Good.

Introductory note: I stumbled into this problem of praise my first year as an undergraduate, in a
course on Philosophy of Religion. Since then it’s been one of the several challenges I continue to
wrestle with, as both a self-critiquing Catholic and a student to philosophy. Only recently did I
return to the issue with a new lens, after a summer of collaborative research on Stoicism,
Daoism, and contemporary views of free agency. This experience equipped me with methods to
intertwine religious ideals of freedom with the messy, metaphysical issues that continue to
mystify contemporary thinkers today.
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Senior Honors Project
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Is a Perfect God Worthy of Our Praise?
I. INTRODUCTION
In discussions of an agent’s responsibility, or worthiness for praise and blame,
philosophers aim to identify conditions for moral agency or freedom. When applying some
concepts of responsibility to the Judeo-Christian notion of God, however, problems arise. The
issue this paper addresses is generated by the claim that God’s perfect goodness is essential to
God. An essentially perfectly good God could do none other than the perfectly good action;
moreover, God could not be more or less perfect than what God essentially is. These restrictions
seem to create a problem for praise: after all, why praise a God who is not free to do otherwise?
In light of this issue, I will first consider two possibilities for praising God: praising God
for what God does and praising God for who God is. Daniel Howard-Snyder, among others,
examines God’s inability to do otherwise and concludes, with discomfort, that the practice of
praising God is rational only if God is not essentially unsurpassably good. Howard-Snyder raises
an interesting issue, though within a narrow framework for freedom and responsibility – one that
hinges on the ability to do otherwise. In this project, I hope to expand the discussion to include
different ways of thinking about praise. Recent work on moral responsibility has illuminated
distinctions between praise and blame-oriented attitudes to elucidate different forms of
responsibility. Following Susan Wolf’s asymmetrical thesis, I will argue that the blame-focused
responsibility that requires access to alternatives does not accurately capture praise-warranting
conditions. To understand the form of responsibility relevant for praising God, I will appeal to a
version of Gary Watson’s aretaic responsibility: a perspective of responsibility that doesn’t hold
the agent accountable, but merely attributes actions to an agent as manifestations of their virtue
or character (Watson 1996: 229).1
I will argue that while God may not possess an accountability-kind of responsibility, God
does possess aretaic responsibility – and this is sufficient for rendering appropriate certain kinds
of praise. I hope to demonstrate that the conditions relevant for such praise should focus on the

1

aretaic comes from the Greek root arête, meaning excellence or virtue (Hursthouse 2018)
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agent’s alignment with the Good, rather than on the agent’s ability to do otherwise. Finally, I
briefly describe some further puzzles that arise from my application of Wolf’s view. First,
though, I’d like to make a few preliminary notes.
II. THE ‘RIGHTNESS’ OF PRAISE
People: It is right to give him thanks and praise.
Celebrant: It is right, and a good and joyful thing, always and everywhere to give thanks
to you, Father Almighty, Creator of heaven and earth (Rite Two of Catholic Eucharistic
Prayer, as cited in Howard-Snyder 2008: 1).
What do we mean by “it is right to give God praise”? One reading could be that there is
motivation to praise God for the favorable consequences the practice would bring about; for
example, it might promote self-flourishing, spiritual comfort, or relationship with the Divine
(Howard-Snyder 2008: 2). Another reading of the term “right” could be that it is one’s duty or
obligation to praise God. My use of the terms ‘right’, ‘appropriate’, and ‘warranted’ in this paper
will employ neither of these readings; my interest, instead, solely involves the worthiness of the
object of praise. I suspect, too, that the first two readings only explain the appropriateness of
praise insofar as there is some trait in God’s activity or being that warrants praise in the first
place, though that is discussion for another time.2
I also aim to limit the discussion to praise in the moral sense. No doubt, Judeo-Christian
expressions of praise reference God’s power, might, beauty, artistry, and so on.3 The kind of
praise I’m after, though, is the kind that references God’s Goodness. For this reason, I would like
to simplify the discussion by setting aside puzzles of gratitude and love. Indeed, praise-in-themoral-sense often involves attitudes of gratitude or love. But when feeling grateful or love for a
person or their actions one needn’t exercise moral judgement.4 Though similar problems of
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Daniel Howard-Snyder opens his piece “The Puzzle of Prayer and Thanksgiving” with a similar
point: “Indeed, other reasons for thanks and praise either don’t apply to God (e.g. his feelings
would be hurt if we didn’t thank and praise him) or, if they do apply to him, they apply at least in
part because he is worthy of our thanks and praise (e.g. thanking and praising promotes and
preserves our relationship with him)” (2008:2).
3
see, for example, 1 Chronicles 29:11
4
In their work “Love as a Reactive Emotion”, Kate Abramson and Adam Leite make an
interesting case for love as a “reaction to perceived morally significant traits in the love-object"
(2011: 674). There is significant dispute, however, as to whether love is reasons-responsive. (For
further reading on this, Harry Frankfurt’s Reasons of Love is a good place to start.)
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agency may challenge attitudes of gratitude, I fear the best solution I can arrive at for
praiseworthiness may not directly serve as explanation for God’s worthiness of thanks.
III. THE PROBLEM: GOD LACKS LEEWAY
There are two popular notions of divine praise: praising X for what X does and praising X
for who X is. Against the claim that an essentially perfect being is praiseworthy in the first sense,
Daniel Howard-Snyder argues that one deserves thanks or praise for their action only if that
action ‘redounds to one’s credit’; and, if an action redounds to one’s credit, then they must have
been able to do something worse in place of it (Howard-Snyder 2008: 2, 3). From these
premises, Howard-Snyder concludes that since God is unable to do anything worse in place of
the actions he performs, those acts fail to “redound to his credit”. Thus, God cannot be both
essentially unsurpassably good and worthy of our praise.
Howard-Snyder's argument employs a picture of moral responsibility that presupposes
some ability to do otherwise, a thesis known as the Principle of Alternate Possibilities (PAP). By
this picture of free will,5 we might imagine an agent’s future as “a garden of forking paths
branching off from a single past”, where “freely willed action arises” whenever present
circumstances offer multiple paths into the future (McKenna and Coates 2020). But must every
instance of action that redounds to our credit require a fork in the road?
Looser applications of PAP attribute responsibility for actions so long as there are some
points of leeway, or alternate possibilities, in the agent’s past. Robert Kane develops this view
with his account of ultimate responsibility. He points out that the freedom we really care about
when we worry about possibly deterministic factors governing our lives –e.g., the laws of
physics, necessary causes, and/or, in God’s case, essential properties – isn’t mere freedom of
action but, rather, the freedom of the will (Kane 2009: 35-44). In Kane’s view, "an agent can be
ultimately responsible” for decisions causally-determined by the agent’s character traits, “[b]ut
somewhere among the events that contributed (however indirectly) to her having those traits, and
thus to her decision, there must have been some free actions by her that were not causally

5

In this paper, I associate the terms ‘free will’ and ‘free agency’ with moral responsibility in the
sense that an agent is morally responsible for action only if they act of their free will. In the
discussion to follow, I will distinguish different kinds of responsibility, which require different
kinds of free will or free agency.
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determined” (Clarke 2017).6 In other words, at the time of action, the agent need not deliberate
on and have access to a range of possibilities to be ultimately responsible for each action; rather,
they merely need the ability to have done otherwise at some, character-forming point(s) in time
in their respective histories (ibid). Kane calls actions made at those previous critical junctions,
self-forming actions (SFA’s):
Often in everyday life, we act “of our own free will” in the sense of a will already
formed. But on such occasions, the will (i.e., character, motives and purposes) from
which we act is “our own free will” to the extent that we had a role in forming it by
earlier SFAs that were not determined and with respect to which we could have
voluntarily and rationally done otherwise.
Many times, it’s those actions which redound to the agent’s credit that are most predictable,
given that agent’s character. When an action simply flows from an agent’s well-formed will and
history, it’s natural to consider that agent ultimately responsible – even if any other decision
would seem utterly implausible for that agent to commit.7
For divine agency, however, the forking path model at some earlier point in God’s history
is an awkward fit. If God’s unsurpassable goodness is truly essential, God does not enjoy the
“liberty” of SFA’s – there is but one path of unsurpassably good choices. Without those forks in
the road, God seems to be much less “free” than humans in a deeper, self-forming sense, as not
even God could be greater than ‘the Being than which no greater is possible’ (Saint Anselm, as
cited in Oppy 2020). For some, this inability to self-refine not only poses a threat for the praiseworthiness of God’s actions, but also for our second form of praise: praising God for who God
is.

6

In focusing on the specific threat that PAP poses to divine freedom, I will set aside the broader
worry of causal determinism relevant to human agents’ responsibility. As the forthcoming
discussion will demonstrate, the worry for the praiseworthiness of divine agency involves an
internal determinism, due to essential traits. This is to be contrasted with human agents,
supposing we are “free” from necessary forces of imperfections or perfections in character.
7
In his famous challenge against Rome, Martin Luther concludes, “Here I stand; I cannot do
otherwise; God help me!” We could take his statement in the most literal sense, yet still consider
his action as redounding to his credit. In doing so, though, we are referring to his history of selfforming choices, which led him to circumstances (both external and inward) that left him no
other option but to stand up against injustice.

Cortens 6
As Howard-Snyder points out, praising God for who God is, confronts the same issues
we’d begun with:
Roughly, if God is worthy of praise for who he is, he is worthy of praise for his goodness,
in which case it redounds to his credit that he is good, which implies that there was a time
when he was able to do something about whether he is good. But, if God is essentially
unsurpassable in goodness, there never was such a time. Thus, if God is essentially
unsurpassable in goodness, he is not worthy of praise for who he is (Howard-Snyder
2008: 20).
In short, God’s character and will are just as bound by God’s essential properties as God’s
actions are bound by those same essential properties. Another way of conceiving this issue is in
terms of historicism, “the view that whether an agent is responsible...depends not just on how the
agent is then, but also on the agent’s history” (Kittle 2016: 105-106). As Simon Kittle describes
the view,
...the idea is that the agent performs a series of actions which contribute to the forming of
their character. In doing so, they become responsible not only for their character but also
for any actions which subsequently issue automatically from that character (106).
Kittle refers to Kevin Timpe’s work on divine freedom to show how historicism resolves certain
actions issued from ‘fixed’ characters. The saints in heaven are thought to be perfectly good, or
“impeccable”, once in heaven; however, they can still be considered free agents (and thus
responsible for even their perfect actions) because of the choices they’d made during their
earthly lives that had led them to those fixed characters (Kittle 2016: 106). Unlike the saints’
respective characters, God’s is never ‘unfixed’; thus, historicism-accounts for free agency fail to
explain God’s responsibility for God’s own goodness.
Some might defend the view that God does make some undetermined choices via access
to alternatives. God might, for example, at least sometimes have the ability to choose between
two or more equally (morally) good options. Though this poses an interesting possibility for
divine agency, solutions that come of it seem to fall short of praise-warranting agency.
According to Judeo-Christian thought, God is not only thought to be morally perfect, but also
perfectly rational; in other words, God must always have sufficient reason for acting (Kittle
2016: 115). In choosing between two equally perfect actions, however, God would be choosing
one over another either out of (i) randomness, or (ii) reasons other than moral reasons. The
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former option – which we might think of as a “coin-toss” result – seems to dispute God’s
property of perfect rationality; the latter exhibits a reasons-responsiveness, but not of the right
sort for moral praise.
If (ii) is true, other forms of praise may still apply. Perhaps, for example, we deem God’s
agency appropriate for praise for the aesthetic route God opted for in creating this world, over a
different-looking world. But my concern is praise in the moral sense. Option (i), on the other
hand, doesn’t seem to grant God enough freedom for the kind of responsibility we care about. As
J.M. Fischer puts it, “responsibility requires that there be alternative possibilities of a certain
sort” (Fischer 1998: 100); in Fischer’s view, these mere “flickers of freedom” do not exhibit the
guidance control from the agent that grounds moral responsibility. Fischer argues that “the mere
possibility of something different happening” isn’t enough to ground our judgements of
responsibility (ibid). This seems to suggest that something more than mere alternate possibilities
matter for praise-warranting agency. Mere choice isn’t enough; moral reasons, whatever their
role may be, seem to matter more.
So long as we grant that God, indeed, lacks the freedom to do otherwise, there remain
two challenges for defending God’s moral responsibility: one to do with the freedom involved
with God’s actions, and the other to do with the freedom involved with God’s character, or selfformation. But all this relies on the notion of moral responsibility as contingent upon the ability
to do otherwise -- if not in the narrow sense, then at least at some previous point in the road. In
most recent discussions, though, authors have challenged the relevance of AP’s for praise-related
attitudes and for certain kinds of responsibility.
IV. ASYMMETRIES BETWEEN PRAISE AND OTHER JUDGEMENTS OF
RESPONSIBILITY
The interesting thing about the worrisome sort of ‘determinism’ that lies behind God’s
goodness is its internal nature. The Judeo-Christian notion of God represents an agent perfectly
free from external sources of determinism, but meanwhile confined – in action and character – to
an internal necessitation. Susan Wolf addresses a popular worry that bears significant
resemblance to our present problem: that psychological determinism would undermine human
free agency. The concern is that psychological determinism – the condition in which our inward
states necessitate the decisions we act on – undermines the free agency we care about for
responsibility practices like blame, praise, and resentment (Wolf 1980: 152). The idea is that if
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an agent’s actions are determined by their interests (ie. desires, values), and those interests “are
determined by heredity and environment”, then the agent seems to lack a certain requisite control
over his actions, as “he cannot but perform the actions he performs” (1980: 152). Wolf exposes a
conflicting intuition, however, when it comes to praiseworthy action:
When we imagine an agent who performs right actions...we imagine an agent who is
rightly determined: whose actions, that is, are determined by the right sorts of interests,
and whose interests are determined by the right sorts of reasons. But an agent who is not
psychologically determined cannot perform actions that are right in this way (Wolf 1980:
153, my italics).
Why not? A completely undetermined agent is so free that their decision-making is “free from
moral reasons” (1980: 166). It seems, then, our intuitions tell us that some determinism is
important for us to salvage the moral responsibility we expect from praiseworthy activity.
Moreover, a certain psychological determinism to do the right thing may seem to make the agent
or their action even more praiseworthy. As Wolf points out, the language “he couldn’t help it” or
“she couldn’t resist” expresses a certain excellence or virtue in the agent’s disposition (1980:
156). An inability to do anything other than the right thing shouldn’t lessen the credit that he
deserves, “[f]or presumably the reason he cannot do otherwise is that his virtue is so sure or his
moral commitment so strong” (1980: 156). So, to mend this rift in our intuitions, Wolf proposes
an Asymmetrical Thesis for freedom: praiseworthiness does not require that the agent could have
done otherwise, while blameworthiness does. Could Wolf be right?
In some cases, it might seem that some amount of indeterminism does seem to be
relevant for praiseworthiness. Jonathon Bennett draws out the following example. Imagine a
seemingly generous benefactor who, in reality, suffers from a perpetual, insane compulsion to
give things away. Upon discovering this psychological explanation for the agent’s acts, it seems
reasonable that our praise-related attitudes toward the agent and their gift-giving would change
(Bennett 2008: 2). But do we retract our praise because the agent lacked an ability to do
otherwise?8

8

Unlike Wolf, Bennett does not make any asymmetrical distinction between praiseworthiness
and blameworthiness; rather, he considers both susceptible to issues of avoidability (see in
discussion below) and relevant for accountability (see Bennett 2008: 2).

Cortens 9
If we follow Wolf’s view, the answer is no. The reason why our attitudes change instead
has to do with the agent’s capacity to recognize and act in accord with the relevant moral reasons
(Watson 1996: 241). The compulsive benefactor’s action is not governed by any reasons
(generosity, frugality, and so on) that would indicate the exercise of her moral capacity; rather,
she acts out of compulsion. Praise-related attitudes would seem to be an inappropriate response
to the benefactor’s agency. The reason, though, doesn’t have to do with the agent’s lack of
alternatives; rather, it’s a certain sensitivity to moral reasons that’s missing. From this shift in
focus to moral considerations as central to free agency arises the asymmetry between
praiseworthiness and blameworthiness. As Watson lays out,
If someone acts well because of a moral clarity and commitment so strong that she could
not have done otherwise, then we still think her praiseworthy. But if she acts badly
because her deprived childhood has rendered her unable to care about the moral
considerations in question, then she is not thought to be blameworthy (ibid).
Wolf describes this sensitivity to “the True and the Good” as the sanity condition. She offers this
source of internal freedom as the kind relevant for moral responsibility:
although we may not be metaphysically responsible for ourselves -- for, after all, we did
not create ourselves from nothing – we are morally responsible for ourselves, for we are
able to understand and appreciate right and wrong, and to change our characters and our
actions accordingly (2013: 292).9
In a sense, God’s decisive character of essentially unsurpassable goodness resembles the case of
psychological determinism: both agents “have characters that inevitably lead to certain
[behavior] the production of which they did not control” (Kittle 2016: 109).10 Though there are
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Wolf is not the first to shift the picture of free agency toward a focus on the internal structure of
the agent. Her "sane deep-self view” builds off of other views of internally sourced freedom
(which she calls ’deep-self views’), such as those offered by Gary Watson, Harry Frankfurt, and
Charles Taylor. The distinguishing feature of Wolf’s view is that the normative component of
her account is linked to an objective source of morally correct reasons. While Watson, Frankfurt,
and Taylor source agential control in the ability to accord our actions with “our deepest selves”,
Wolf argues that moral agency requires the further ability to accord our deep selves to the True
and the Good. Self-revision isn’t enough; rather, moral responsibility requires “the capacity for
self-correction" (Wolf 2013: 292, 293, my italics).
10
In his commentary on Timpe’s work, Kittle likens God’s case of internal determinism to his
imagined Colin character, who has acquired a trait which makes him experience “a psychological
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no external factors (ie. heredity or environment) to determine God’s interests, God is internally
bound by a determining, essential feature. Due to this source of metaphysical determinism, God
lacks that same kind of ‘control’ (via access to AP’s) that the compulsive gift-giver lacks.
‘Compulsive’ would be a surprising description for God; we might picture, however, a similar
immediacy – a certain non-deliberation, or absence in choice – to God’s activity. The difference
between God and the compulsive beneficiary, though, is that God’s activity is morally
expressive. While the gift-giver acts out of compulsion, God acts from Perfect Goodness. God
didn’t just commit a perfect act in creating the universe; God committed the act perfectly – that
is, in perfect accord with the True and the Good.
As some have pointed out, views preoccupied with an access to alternatives are often
oriented around a concern about avoidability. Both Watson and Wolf consider this a
distinguishing trait for accountability practices, as it’s “these concerns about fairness that
underlie the requirement of control (or avoidability) as a condition of moral accountability”
(Watson 1996: 235). To weigh the appropriateness of blame-related accountability practices, it is
natural to consider whether the agent could avoid the blame she receives for her action – and
without access to alternatives, the agent has no way of avoiding the resentment, reprimand, or
blame that her actions result in. In other words, we only deserve to suffer the blame we can avoid
(Watson 1996: 239); meanwhile, praise does not run up against this same issue of ‘fairness’ for
the agent.
Another reason to set aside the AP-requirement for cases of praiseworthy agency is that
praiseworthiness often references an agent’s virtue or excellence, which does not fit the schema
of minimum conditions. The AP-requirement suggests certain bare minimum standards of moral
agency only relevant for the practice of holding an agent responsible. Andrew Eshleman
challenges the method of “mirroring” praise-conditions onto our intuitive views of blameconditions:
This methodological assumption is often accompanied by a more substantive
assumption[:] that the freedom reflected in action that warrants praise is no different from
the freedom exercised by the agent who merits blame. ...[T]his assumption obscures

state that makes it inevitable…he will pick up the phone and donate some money to charity”
(Kittle 2016: 109).
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important aspects of genuinely virtuous agency since part of what we often find
praiseworthy is an enhancement of the virtuous agent’s freedom (Eshleman 2014: 217).
Eshleman seeks to decouple praise and blame as counterparts to acknowledge the ‘enhancement’
of freedom that virtuous agency often reflects. While accounts for blameworthiness examine an
agent’s capacity to fulfill certain minimal moral demands, accounts for praiseworthiness tend to
consider the excellence of one’s action or character – whose virtue goes beyond the threshold of
“minimal decency” relevant for holding a person accountable (Eshleman 2014: 216, 233). God’s
situation highlights the flaw in threshold-notions for praise-related agency; as Kittle points out
(though to address a different issue), “being perfectly morally good encompasses more than just
fulfilling one’s obligations” (Kittle 2015: 115).11 If we combine this with Wolf’s view, we might
understand ’sanity’ as a degree-concept, that can exceed and be perfected beyond the minimum
capacity required for blame-focused moral responsibility. Eshleman notes, “the point is not
merely that the actions of some people are more virtuous than others...but that people vary in the
degree to which they can, or are free to, act virtuously” (2014: 233-234). This might explain the
disjunction between God’s lack of alternatives and the Judeo-Christian conception of God’s
optimal freedom. The challenges in section III reference a kind of freedom that is perhaps
relevant for candidacy in the blame-world; virtue or excellence, though, express a kind of
freedom in which matters of control and choice seem to eventually fall away, the more perfectlyfixed an agent’s character becomes. God, as perfectly free, enjoys perfect unity between God’s
character, motivations, and the Good. In the close of “Free Agency”, Watson imagines God as
“the only free agent” with this unity in mind; his notion of free agency, however, emphasizes an
internal cohesion between values and motives within the agent:
In the case of God, who is omnipotent and omniscient, there can be no disparity between
valuational and motivational systems. The dependence of motivation upon evaluation is
total, for there is but a single source of motivation: his presumably benign judgement
(Watson 1975: 220).
Though the unity between God’s valuational and motivational systems is important, my Wolfinspired emphasis is on an accordance to reasons external to the agent’s internal systems, ie. the
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Kittle responds with this to a different matter: the possibility that God could create some world
other than the best possible world, having no obligation (to us) to create any particular world at
all.
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Good. God’s perfectly “benign judgement” is the perfected version of an increasingly “fixed”,
virtuous character. In praising God, one acknowledges God’s perfect insight of the relevant,
normative reasons.
In sum, there are at least three reasons to decouple accounts for praiseworthiness and
views that involve AP-conditions. As Wolf points out, praiseworthy action already indicates a
sense of moral sanity in the agent; so long as an agent exhibits this capacity, it does not matter if
they had the ability to do otherwise. Moreover, a certain kind of psychological determinism from
praiseworthy agents indicates a virtuous character, or moral excellence; and, if these cases of
psychological determinism do not follow the PAP-model, neither should the case of God’s
internal necessitation. Finally, there seems to be an enhanced ‘freedom’ found in virtuous agency
– one that cannot be explained by the structure of ‘minimal decency’ which grounds
accountability practices. One might wonder, though, what this notion of free agency looks like in
terms of responsibility. Before turning to Watson’s ‘aretaic face’ of responsibility, I’d like to
further discuss my application of Wolf’s view and what sort of notion of ‘agency’ comes of it
when applied to the case of the Divine.
V. THE DEPARTURE FROM CONTROL-VIEWS
Wolf’s account of free agency was not the first to take a normative turn in the moral
responsibility discussion; rather, several works before her shifted focus from metaphysical
constraints to instead the agent’s evaluative structure and capacity. Wolf offers a version of a
preexisting view – what she calls the deep self view – referencing notions of free agency from
other authors, such as Harry Frankfurt and Gary Watson,. Proponents of the deep self view aim
to source an agent’s action to the “deep self” of the agent. Wolf writes,
As Frankfurt, Watson, and Taylor showed us, in order to be free and responsible we need
not only to be able to control our actions in accordance with our desires, we need to be
able to control our desires in accordance with our deepest selves (2013: 292).
Wolf points out that the deep-self views seek control via self-reformation. In each of these views,
candidacy for moral accountability requires an ability to self-revise. For Frankfurt, the revision
consists in according ‘first-order desires’ with second- or higher-order desires, which Frankfurt
conceives as associated to the deeper self. As Frankfurt famously puts it, “a person’s will is free
only if he is free to have the will he wants” (Frankfurt 1971: 18). For Watson, on the other hand,
self-revision consists in according one’s motivational systems to their deeper, evaluative
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structures (see Watson 1975). As mentioned above, since there is no disparity in God’s ‘mesh’,
or internal structures, God is supremely free on this view (1975: 220). These authors and other
proponents of ‘deep-self’ views attribute an agent’s conduct to her deep self when “she is at
liberty (or able) both to govern her behavior on the basis of her will and to govern her will on the
basis of her valuational system” (Wolf 1990: 33, as cited in Talbert 2019). Rather than seeking a
kind of control over exterior circumstances (such as access to alternate possibilities), they vest
agential ‘control’ in strictly the internal systems of the agent. It’s not freedom of action we care
about; it’s freedom of the will (Frankfurt 1971: 14).12 In Wolf’s view, however, “there is a
further kind of freedom we can want”: the ability to self-correct (Wolf 2013: 292). It’s not just
the ability to change our values and desires that matters to us, but the ability to change them for
the better.
There may be the worry that each of these deep-self views, Wolf’s included, are
grounded in something specific to finite, human agents: that ability to self-revise. Is this a
necessary component for an agents’ praiseworthiness? As discussed in Section III, God's
necessary perfection nixes any possibility of self-creation or self-revision. This tension between
contemporary conceptions of free agency – as freedom of the will – and the case of divine agency
reveals a couple things about how we might apply Wolf’s theory. First, it’s important to
remember that the self-correction requirement – according to Wolf’s Asymmetrical Thesis – is
only important for blameworthy cases of agency. If someone already exhibited the capacity to
get it right, the condition of self-revision falls away. In other words, PAP-conditions, even in
their looser forms (recall historicism and SFA views) seem unnecessary in the praiseworthy
realm since the agent has already demonstrated the capacity to recognize and guide their
behavior in accordance with the Good. In passing judgements about the praiseworthiness of
others’ actions, then, we set self-revision expectations aside.
The second point is not a reminder, but rather, an observation about Wolf’s selfcorrection view and its role in the common, human concern about freedom. Although it may only
apply as a condition for blameworthy cases, it is worth considering why the capacity to selfcorrect might be the further kind of freedom we would want. As agents capable of praising and
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Among others, Frankfurt’s and Watson’s views are known as ’mesh theories’, which give
accounts for freedom “in terms of a well-functioning harmony between different psychic
subsystems leading to action” (McKenna 2015: 45).
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being praiseworthy, we very much care about our ability to self-correct. Indeed, it seems that
receiving praise from others when we act well despite a flawed character can, at times, bring us
to recognize the Good (surprisingly, via our own actions), so we might correct our characters
accordingly. And more, in praising others, we often reference virtuous traits – traits that are
exemplary and important to us in our own human paths of self-formation. So, though selfcorrection is not a condition for praiseworthiness, our human interest in it does seem to indicate a
kind of ‘reference point’ for praise-judgements and moral judgements in general. As mentioned
earlier, Eshleman associates moral excellence with an ‘enhancement’ of freedom. The interest in
self-correction is important for finite beings, then, as it leads us to be more virtuous selves and
thus, more free. God’s situation, meanwhile, already achieves the ideal of the perfectly virtuous
Self, given God’s essential features. While accountability-practices indicate a reference point of
bare minimal decency (and meanwhile a “threshold” of “freedom-relevant capacities”, see
Eshleman 2014: 233), praise-responses reference a point toward which the human agent must
self-correct oneself – a state of virtue (and perfect freedom-relevant capacity) which God already
achieves.
Some worry that this picture of freedom does not capture the kind of agency relevant for
moral responsibility. In his “Possibilities for Divine Freedom”, Kittle explores the possibility that
‘normative conceptions of freedom’ (such as Wolf’s) are answering an issue altogether different
from moral responsibility. Kittle contrasts the normative conception of freedom with the
“choice-focused control based theory” for freedom, associating the former with human
flourishing, rather than the concern about moral responsibility (Kittle 2016: 103). He notes how
different uses of the word ‘free’ can represent this disconnection between normative conceptions
and moral responsibility:
We say...that the water is free to flow down the channel, but that doesn’t imply that the
water exerts any kind of control over how it flows. This use of ‘free’ does suggest a lack
of external obstacle but does not suggest an exercise of control. The use of ‘free’ in
normative accounts of freedom concerns whether or not the agent has the capacities
which allow it to achieve its true end and whether it exercises those capacities. But it’s
possible that, like with the use of ‘free’ applicable to water, it implies nothing about the
agent’s ability to control things (2016: 103).
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The analogy is fitting for the divine case. Granted the Judeo-Christian notion of God’s aseity,
God is perfectly autonomous and self-derived; in other words, nothing external to God could
influence the freedom of God’s character or action. Meanwhile, God is restricted to only the path
or “channel” carved out by God’s own, essential Goodness.13 This image of ‘freely’ flowing
water invokes the worry that the kind of freedom I’ve ascribed to God is “not about control” –
“and therefore not about moral responsibility” (Kittle 2016: 103).
Indeed, the further we stray from control-centered views, the more mysterious the
application of the term ‘responsibility’ seems. Maybe ‘praiseworthy’ is the most we can say
about God’s agency and character, while ‘morally responsible’ oversteps my arrived-at
conception of God’s freedom.14 But maybe not. As I will defend in the following sections, there
is a kind of moral responsibility that can capture God’s ‘uncontrolled’, morally expressive
behavior.
VI. THE ARETAIC FACE OF RESPONSIBILITY
Gary Watson makes an important distinction between responsibility in the attributability
sense and responsibility in the accountability sense. He identifies the former with the selfdisclosure view, “a view of free action and will as autonomy” (Watson 1996: 227). In this view,
actions are free so long as they “express ourselves, in the required sense, whatever their farther
causes may be” (ibid). According this face of responsibility, an agent is responsible for their
action in the sense that their action is attributable to the deeper self, or the character, of the agent.
As Watson puts it, “the significant relation between behavior and the real self is not (just) causal
but executive and expressive” (1996: 233). While some regard attributability as morally shallow,
Watson believes the self-disclosure view depicts “a core notion of responsibility,” and thus can
warrant moral appraisal:

13

Interestingly, the Daodejing of Laozi incorporates the image of water as a metaphor for both
the dao (“the way”) and de (“the virtue”). The virtuous state is associated with being “supple and
weak” (Ch. 78), “expansive...[f]lowing to the left and to the right” (Ch. 34), and lowly, situated
as the “lesser state” (Ch. 61,66). It seems only the sage can achieve this, as wholly governed by
the humble spontaneity of the Way. (See also Lu for further discussion and chapters of
reference.)
14
Or, worse, maybe praise for God and God’s action is altogether morally empty; in other words,
praise with respect to God’s goodness would be no different from the kind of praise that
acknowledges God’s other admirable, essential traits, such as “all-powerful”, or applauding God
for creating something beautiful (recall these distinctions in Section II).
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. …evaluations [of the exercises of an agent’s moral capacity] are inescapably evaluations
of the agent because the conduct in question expresses the agent’s own evaluative
commitments, her adoption of some ends among others. …[I]f what I do flows from my
values and ends, there is a stronger sense in which my activities are inescapably my own:
I am committed to them. As declarations of my adopted ends, they express what I’m
about, my identity as an agent (1996: 233).
For Watson, evaluations from the “aretaic perspective” are those that recognize an agent’s deeper
self – the excellences or faults in their character -- in their actions (1996: 231). Whereas
accountability accounts of responsibility may further seek to determine the agent’s control over
those “adopted ends” from which their action flows, the attributability face of responsibility
simply attributes an agent’s activity to the agent, so long as the activity flows from their
“evaluative self” (Watson 1975). Watson’s conceived aretaic forms of praise and blame are
responsive to the moral qualities of the agent, though they are “independent of...the practices of
moral accountability” (Watson 1996: 231, Eshleman 2014: 218).
Eshleman further develops Watson’s distinction between these two kinds of
responsibility. While Watson seems to equate the aretaic face of responsibility with the more
general responsibility-as-attributability, Eshleman distinguishes aretaic responsibility from “the
minimal sort of attributability,” identifying the former as “the more robust sort” (Eshleman 2014:
230). He writes,
Our assessment of whether an agent’s action is properly attributable to her is concerned
with whether the action is her own in the relevant sense. The relevant sense of ownership
in the first minimal sense of attributability is defined by whether the action reflects the
unimpaired exercise of that minimal form of agency distinctive of personhood. This form
of responsibility-as-attributability is not, strictly speaking, a form of moral responsibility,
though it serves as a baseline precondition of forms of moral responsibility. This can be
seen from the fact that a young child’s actions may be attributable in this minimal sense
well before she possesses those further capacities that allow for genuine moral
responsibility (2014: 230).
God, of course, possesses the perfect “capacities that allow for genuine moral responsibility” in
the most ethically robust aretaic sense. Moreover, the aretaic face of responsibility depicts
agency in a way that best fits the perfect, streamline correspondence (or “flow”) between God’s
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character and God’s action. As Watson imagines elsewhere, God suffers “no disparity” between
God’s internal structures (say, character and will); and, since external constraints are impossible
for God, there is nothing to disconnect God’s character and will from God’s activity.
In Section III, I began by posing the puzzle of God’s praiseworthiness in two ways:
God’s praiseworthiness for who God is, and God’s praiseworthiness for what God does. With the
aretaic perspective of responsibility, this distinction seems to fall away in the divine case. From
the aretaic perspective, evaluations on the agent’s conduct are, in fact, evaluations of the agent’s
“ends”; and, as Watson puts it, “an agent’s ends” are “necessarily self-disclosing" (1996: 234). In
David Hume’s famous Second Treatise, he presents a view that would perhaps identify
responsibility with strictly the aretaic sort:
Actions are by their very nature temporary and perishing; and where they proceed not
from some cause in the characters and disposition of the person, who performed them,
they infix not themselves upon him, and can neither redound to his honour, if good, nor
infamy, if evil. The action itself may be blameable...But the person is not responsible for
it; and as it proceeded from nothing in him, that is durable or constant, and leaves nothing
of that nature behind it, it is impossible he can, upon its account, become the object of
punishment or vengeance (III.ii, my emphasis).
Many are uncomfortable with the Humean picture of responsibility, as it’s common to blame or
praise an agent for their action even when they’ve acted out of character. With respect to God,
however, the distinction between praising “the action itself” and praising “the person” falls
away. As a perfectly-‘meshed’ agent, God is incapable of acting out of character.
Whereas Wolf draws the line between praise and blame, made separate by the controlrequirement (some ability to do otherwise), Watson draws a line between the accountability face
and the attributability face of responsibility. Though Wolf’s view does not ascribe the same
ethical depth to attributability which Watson defends, these two views are compatible – in at
least some ways – for the case of the divine. While accountability responsibility is inapplicable
for God, God retains aretaic responsibility since divine agency perfectly expresses the relation
between conduct and character. As Wolf’s and other deep-self views illustrate, issues of
praiseworthiness are best associated with issues of internal structure and capacities, rather than
with issues of control. Wolf’s additional condition of “moral sanity”, however, adds something
puzzling to the picture of God’s responsibility. In the human case, this element of freedom
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references an external source: the True and the Good. Problems arise, however, if we consider
the Good external to God in the same way.
VII. A PUZZLING RELATIONSHIP: GOD AND THE GOOD
Unlike Watson’s and Frankfurt’s internal views of freedom, Wolf’s view depends on a
sensitivity to reasons external to the agent. We might describe ‘reasons-responsive’ views such
as Wolf’s as “directed outwardly” (McKenna 2015: 45); rather than solely relying on “another
loop [in] the internal structure of the agent”, free agency requires a responsiveness to reasons
outside the agent (Wolf, as cited in Watson 1996: 233). In the discussion above, I’ve noted that
a) God meets the inward criterion of praise-warranting, free agency, and b) God meets the
“sanity” condition (and does so perfectly), as maximally sensitive to the True and the Good.
Furthermore, God can be considered free in the responsibility sense, so long as we take on the
aretaic perspective of responsibility, which attributes actions to an agent when they flow from
their character. But here a question arises from Wolf’s outwardly-directed view: what is the
relationship between God’s character, or internal structures, and those reasons of the Good?
This is a version of a long-standing issue for theists on how best to understand the
grounds for moral truth, whose promptings can be traced as far back as Plato’s dialogues. In the
famous exchange between Socrates and Euthyphro, Euthyphro claims, “piety is what all the gods
love, and... impiety is what they all hate” (as cited in Timmons 2002: 27). Socrates replies, with
the famous ‘Euthyphro’s dilemma’: Do the god’s love piety because it is pious, or is it pious
because they love it? (ibid). In other words -- and in the context of the Judeo-Christian God –
“[e]ither morality depends on God’s commands, or it does not” (Timmons 2002: 28). So which is
it? Though space will not allow for full treatment of the issue here, I will briefly discuss the main
alternatives in relation to the present project.
One could take the view that reasons underlying moral goodness are independent from
God’s reasons and are thus external to God as they are for any human agent. In this view, God
performs perfectly good actions out of perfect “moral knowledge” of what is right and wrong, a
set of truths independent from God’s self (Timmons 2002: 30). This picture, however, seems to
conflict with the Judeo-Christian notion of God as creator of all that exists. If there exists a
moral standard independent from God, there exists something outside of God’s creation – and,
moreover, something presumably ‘higher’ than (or at least as equally supreme as) God, to which
God must conform God’s own activity.
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Before swinging to the other end of the Euthyphro-inspired alternatives, I will consider a
middle path: that the Good is not completely external to God. Mark Timmons develops this
position “as a way out” for the theist from committing to the view that moral standards wholly
depend on God’s commands:
The gist of the solution to the dilemma that I shall propose involves two main claims: (1)
The theist should recognize that there is an important sense in which what is right and
wrong, good and bad depends on God’s creative choice, and so there is a sense in which
morality depends on God. (2) However, the theist should accept the idea that there are
basic facts about what is right and wrong, good and bad that are independent of God’s
commands (Timmons 2002: 30).
Timmons defends these two claims with the premise that, “[g]iven God’s omnipotence, there are
many possible worlds he might have created, much different from the world he did create” (ibid).
Given the features of the actual world, there exist certain moral laws – but these might not exist
had God’s creation been different. The badness of murder and theft, for instance, depend on the
fact that God created a world of beings that are mortal and depend on an environment with
limited resources (Timmons 2002: 31). Nevertheless, and given that the world is the way it is,
“the truth and correctness” of moral standards in the actual world are independent of God’s
commands. Standards of goodness can be external to God to a degree, while their actual
existence still depends on God’s will as exercised at the time of creation. In this picture, then,
humans praise God in a way that recognizes God as being good to them (via conforming the
divine will and action to the True and the Good) given their design. Timmons’ strategy might
well serve the aims of the present argument; I think, though, that the third strategy has the most
promise.
The third route I consider here is an understanding of the Good as internal to God. To
salvage the notion of God as Creator (which the external view threatens), some moral theorists
turn to versions of Divine Command Theory: the view that distinctions between right and wrong
are real and “rooted in the nature and will of God” (Mortimer 1950, as cited in Timmons 2002:
23). If this were true for God’s performance and character, God’s agency would be strictly
inwardly directed. According to Divine Command Theory, though, “[God's] commands alone
are what make actions right or wrong” (Timmons 2002: 28). This construes an asymmetrical
relation between God and the Good; in the same way that humans’ very existence depend on
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God’s will to create them, reasons of the Good depend on God’s will to command those reasons.
While some theists are comfortable with this view, I find myself with those inclined to reject it.
One source of special discomfort is the goodness of God, God’s-self. Are we really to believe
that God is only good because God says God is good? In the face of this obvious concern, among
others, I wish to take up a more robust vision of the Good and of God’s goodness, while still
conceiving reasons of the Good as internal to God.
Robert Adams develops a less asymmetrical view of this relationship between the Good
and the Divine. He adopts a platonic model for the nature of the Good, with a thesis that
identifies God as the Good:
God is the Good itself, the definitive standard of excellence, occupying roughly the role
assigned to the Form of the Good or the Beautiful in Plato's Republic and Symposium
(Adams 2002: 1)
In Plato’s Symposium, Socrates recites the wise words of Diotima, which illustrate “the idea of a
transcendent Beauty”, a standard of all beauty by which “all other beautiful things are beautiful
by ‘participating’ in it (211 B)” (Adams 2002: 2). Diotima conceives interpersonal love and
common forms of eros as mere steppingstones in an “ascent of desire” (Nussbaum 1979: 144)
toward the transcendent, as these sources of admiration cultivate a growing recognition of and
appreciation for the form of beauty. Plato’s writings pursue an understanding of a single
exemplar for all earthly sources of good and beauty, conceiving an ultimate form of Excellence,
Beauty, or the Good which Judeo-Christian thought seems to adopt:
The Forms, for Plato, have a certain priority. They are the originals, the standard; and in
applying such terms as ‘equal’, ‘good’, and ‘beautiful’ to mundane things, the question is
to what extent they measure up to the standard. In the same way, theists may say that God
is the standard of goodness, to which other good things must in some measure conform,
but never perfectly conform. (Adams 2002: 18).
Identifying God with the platonic concept of the Good places God in an interesting position – as
both an object of ethical pursuit and as an object of praise. In this picture, God’s excellence
provides the standard of human excellence, while “the excellence of other things consists in a
sort of resemblance to God” (Adams 2002: 2).
This view of God as the Good would not only affect our notion of divine agency, but of
human agency, too. An ‘internal relation’ view for God and the Good would be a source of
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departure from Wolf’s ‘outwardly directed’ view; at the same time, though, the platonic path
toward Excellence does seem to capture something about Wolf-Watsonian ideals of agency, at
least on the human level. When free-flowing actions exhibit an enhanced sensitivity to the True
and the Good, agents are especially deserving of aretaic praise – a kind of praise that
acknowledges the excellences of their character. If we adopt Adams’ view, praising God is an act
of appreciating the Good itself; meanwhile, praising other humans (in the aretaic sense) can be
seen as appreciating their Godlikeness. Adams writes,
Aspiration for a transcendent good is central to both [Platonism and theism], and so is the
focus on excellence. Worship, after all, is the acknowledgment, not just of God's benefits
to us, but of the supreme degree of intrinsic excellence. (Adams 2002: 2).
Diotima’s model of ascent via interpersonal admiration seems to trace a model for aretaic
worship and praise. If we grant God as the Good, we might understand our ability to recognize
and praise others’ excellences as part of our own respective paths, to come to understand the
transcendent Excellence. Through our “love of ordinary beauties,” we come to better recognize
and appreciate the exemplar, the Good itself.
Once again, this internal view of the Good runs into tension with the notion of God’s
perfect rationality. Without any reasons external to God’s self, how could there be sufficient
reason for all God’s actions? As God is no longer distinct from God’s own reasons of the Good,
it seems our use of the term ‘maximally sensitive to reasons’ seems to shift. Though God’s
activity is perfectly aligned with reasons of the Good, it’s awkward to imagine God’s agency as
responsive to something God is. On the other hand, it could be that we are simply understanding
the property of ‘perfect rationality’ in the wrong way. Perhaps God is perfectly reasonable as the
source of all reason – in other words, the exemplar of all things rational. Similarly, we might
imagine Picasso’s “Guernica” as the perfect version of the “Guernica”, though there is no
standard of the “Guernica” independent from it. An aspiring artist doesn’t hope to perfect the
original with their own copy; rather, they hope to imitate what is already perfect, the original
itself.
VIII. CONCLUSION
This project began with the puzzle of God’s praiseworthiness and, with some resolution,
ended in puzzles over how best to understand God’s goodness. Nevertheless, the work in
between these two sources of discomfort gives us at least some promising reasons for praising an
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essentially unsurpassable Being. I attempted to address PAP-style challenges to God’s
praiseworthiness and responsibility with notions of free agency that do not rely on access to
alternatives, provided by Susan Wolf and Gary Watson. As Wolf demonstrates with her
Asymmetry Thesis, praiseworthy agency already exhibits a key feature to free agency – the
ability to act according to and be governed by the True and the Good. Thus, praiseworthiness
does not demand the same control-features that blameworthiness requires and that PAP views
demand, via access to alternatives. There was also the worry that the Divine lacks the right kind
of agency to be considered responsible for their actions. Following Watson’s and Eshleman’s
contributions, I sought to show how God can be considered responsible in at least the aretaic
sense. Finally, I hoped to demonstrate with this Wolf/Watson-inspired view of perfect agency
that praiseworthiness for God and praiseworthiness for God’s actions collapse into one kind of
praise; as God suffers no conflict between internal structures, God serves as an exemplar of
virtuous agency – an agent whose acts directly manifest the Goodness of their character.
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